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INTRODUCTION
i: A Research Puzzle and Argument
The power balance between France and Germany in the European Union has been
one of great discussion and debate. Countless journalists have argued that Germany’s
power has risen gradually against the seemingly perpetually stronger France over the past
60 years, and is now finally set to surpass France; but how true are these claims? How
can power within the EU truly be measured? It is a combination of political and social
factors, but overwhelmingly, economic factors, in which Germany has consistently
excelled.
My main argument is that the power balance between France and Germany has
remained relatively stable since the beginning of unionization negotiations. I argue that
the notion that Germany’s power in the European Union has recently surpassed that of
France is false. Journals such as The Economist and The Wall Street Journal have
claimed that France and Germany have become too dissimilar to maintain the strong
relationship they once held, emphasized mostly by their economic differences, which has
led to a breakdown of the Franco-German relationship. The Economist calls the FrancoGerman axis a “myth of an equal partnership,” but history and EU budget analysis say
otherwise. As I will show in my paper, Germany has continually been the largest source
of economic power in the European Union, and has perpetually been the stronger
economic and political power in the Franco-German relationship. This clarification is
important to understand because it emphasizes the continuing importance of Germany in
the Franco-German relationship, as well as the implications for an economically strong
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Germany in the European Union. Germany’s economic influence coupled with France’s
political influence has made for an important and effective leadership in the EU where
cooperation and competition provide the most encompassing results of European policymaking.
My paper consists of three main chapters. The first chapter entitled, “Germany’s
Relative Bargaining Power,” will explore German power relative to French power
throughout the course of unionization discussions, through the creation of the European
Monetary Union, the Stability and Growth Pact, and the creation of the shared currency.
My second chapter, “The Discourse on the Franco-German Relationship,” will examine
the contemporary discourse on the Franco-German power balance and relationship in
scholarly magazines, articles, newspapers, as well as in interviews with European
bureaucrats. This chapter focuses on opinions regarding Germany’s changing political
behavior, France and Germany in the aftermath of the economic crisis, and Germany’s
diverging interests. My third chapter, “Demonstrating Germany’s Relative Power through
an Examination of the EU Budget” will look at the changing composition of contributors
and recipients of EU Budget funds since the creation of the euro, with special emphasis
on German and French contributions, and end with an analysis of the bail-outs and
financial redistributions since the European debt crisis.
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ii: A Background of the Franco-German Relationship
The Franco-German relationship has served as the anchor of European integration
since the creation of the European Union in 1958.1 In the past fifty years, France and
Germany have built a strong partnership based on association, mutual goals, and
friendship, but this did not come before a prolonged period of struggle. The 1963 postwar Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation concluded formally the long-standing conflict
between France and Germany, which included twenty-three wars. Also known as the
Treaty of Friendship, it set an official seal on reconciliation and continuing cooperation
between France and Germany, calling for consultations between the two countries on all
important questions and efforts, and implementing regular summits.2 Despite this formal
pact of cooperation, uncertainty arrived following German integration, as both countries
were forced to adjust to a different power balance caused by the unification of Germany
as well as the Soviet Union’s collapse. Before German reunification, when Germany was
divided and weak and France was fully involved in the political and economic western
world, France was very much the dominant political partner of the two. After 1990
however, Germany regained much of its power and sovereignty, essentially catching up
to France, and transforming into a power to be reckoned with, strategically advantaged
being in the center of Europe.

1

The European Union was originally created as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, which
later led to the European Economic Community (1958). It officially developed its name as the European
Union in 1993. Maclean, Mairi, and Jean-Marc Trouille. France, Germany, and Britain: Partners in a
Changing World. Houndmills, Basingstoke: New York, 2001. Print.
2
Brueggemann, Aminia M. Rhine Crossings France and Germany in Love and War. Albany: State Univ.
of New York, 2005. Print.
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One of the main differences that France and Germany needed to reconcile was
their differing governing strategies within the European Union. France and Germany had
different structures and institutions which made cooperation difficult. France was a
centralized state, similar to the likes of the UK and Spain, while Germany was not, which
made administrative issues challenging.3 Germany preferred to launch joint initiatives,
which took particular importance leading up to the Intergovernmental Conferences. The
success of joint cooperation on initiatives and policy leading up to the IGCs attests to the
strength of the bond and desire for progress between Germany and France. The shared
will to cooperate and create results between the two countries showed that political will
was an essential factor in giving momentum to European Monetary Union policy, which
triumphed over separate policy interests. Negotiations created a shared commitment to
reach success void of blame or argument so that the EMU would emerge successfully
along a smooth path of dialogue and compromise. Throughout all levels of cooperation,
France and Germany remained cognizant of the domestic situation and needs of the other
country.
The creation of the EMU permanently altered the parameters of the FrancoGerman relationship, establishing France and Germany in the center of EU cooperation
amongst the other member states. Though the relationship between the two states was
still tenuous, it was strengthened by a newfound confidence founded in economic and
monetary cooperation. Despite the fact that the First and Second World Wars had been
based upon French and German antagonism, this past antagonism matched the drive with

3

Mazzucelli, Colette. France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the
European Union. New York: Garland Publ., 1997. Print.
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which the Franco-German motor progressed through European unification. This
adjustment of the Franco-German relationship set the tone for the formation of the
European Union. It proved that if France and Germany were able to put aside their
differences for mutual political and economic progress, their fellow member states could
achieve the same goal with even less effort. The collaboration, in effect was more
important to the creation of the EMU rather than the actual functioning of the EMU, as it
set the tone for the rest of its passage. The eurozone’s economic nature made cooperation
even more vital as it forced economic alliance before social association. Europe’s
unification on the basis of Franco-German reconciliation on an economic foundation
reinforced France and Germany’s political bond in addition to its bond throughout social
and defense policies.
The power of the Franco-German relationship was one that was unparalleled to
any previous European partnership. The relationship’s power was derived primarily from
its economic capacity. In 1996, together France and Germany accounted for 56.48% of
the eurozone’s GDP, 57.5% of fixed capital formation, 57.7% of private consumption,
and 45.7% of exports.4 Their weight was also accounted for by the role of their currencies
through bonds, notes, and market instruments. 59% of total bonds issued in 1996 were
held by France and Germany, who provided 53.7% of the EU monetary base circulation.
They also held a shareholding of 49.2% to the central bank, and contributed 39.5% to its
reserves.5 France and Germany roughly owned or dictated 50% of the European Union,
which reinforced the notion that the two countries were the “core” or the “axis” of the

4
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European Union. It also reinforced the sense of duty that it was the joint responsibility of
France and Germany to bring stability and growth to the euro and to the eurozone. The
eurozone acted as a motor for accelerating Franco-German cooperation upon its
foundation in the Elysée contact in economic policy, most notably in economic policy
through financial reforms within the Union in terms of exchange rate policies,
employment and growth policies. Financial reforms urged cooperation over dissent,
strengthening the Franco-German relationship slowly but consistently through the years,
and creating a new institutional context outside of the political direction of its national
parties. At the same time, loyalty between France and Germany continued to grow, as it
proved to be the strongest strategy to ensuring joint political success, despite possible
costs to social democratic ideology.
The economic and political collaboration between France and Germany in
addition to their sheer comparative economic power over the rest of the EU member
states ensured them a position of leadership in the Union. Moreover, other EU member
states were pleased to see the positive result of Franco-German cooperation as
confirmation that they too could converge their views in order to progress politically as a
union. France and Germany were seen as the main bodies with the necessity to converge,
especially in terms of the differing economist and monetarist approaches to the monetary
union6, and differing views concerning economic government and central bank
independence (which have continued into today).

6

The economist and monetarist debates considered of a difference in opinion wherein monetarists believed
that the fixing of exchange rates and the adoption of a common currency would ensure sufficient
convergence of the economies wanting to join the Union. Economists, on the other hand, believed that the
adoption of a single currency should be the end of a lengthy process of convergence for those countries
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Despite their challenging joint history with over twenty conflicts, France and
Germany have become natural allies in building the European Union, creating the closest
and strongest relationship in existence between any two nations. Facing a large number of
differences and obstacles, the convergence between France and Germany since the early
1950s through differing economic philosophies, policies and practices has sustained. This
joint leadership has led to a most critical relationship where France and Germany’s
separate strengths and weaknesses have elevated the relationship to a level matching the
greatest strengths of each country. Germany’s economic vigor combined with France’s
social emphasis has led to the creation of a Europe representative of the desires and
emphases of all of its citizens.
iii: The Current Relationship
“Caught in an intense relationship between love and hate, France and Germany have
engaged in a dialectic marked both by aggression and mistrust, on the one hand, and a
mutual fascination and respect on the other.”7
Today, France and Germany are not just partners in European integration, but also
competitors on political and economic terms.8 Not only are France and Germany the two
largest member states, but their relative power position has increased because they
represented the two prevalent different views in the EU on economic and monetary

wanting to join the Union, and believed that the rigorous conditions possible should be set for the creation
of a common currency. (Eg. Maastricht criteria and Stability & Growth Pact)
7
8

See Note 2: Bruggemann
See Note Maclean & Trouille
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union.9 Germany and France dominate the negotiations and determine the crucial features
of policy outcomes among themselves to the extent that the Franco-German exchange can
be seen as a subset of the multiparty negotiations among the other states.10 By reducing
the number of players in the negotiations to just two, Franco-German negotiations
decrease transaction costs, which in turn increase the probability of compromise.11 From
an intergovernamentalist point of view, the member states arrange themselves in two
factions, siding with either Germany or France to build coalitions.12 This synergy
between France and Germany coupled with the shared desire to seek compromise is one
which, despite times of conflict, always manages to yield desirable results. Today, the
relationship between Germany and France is one of both cooperation and competition.
The two countries have altered their production focuses over the years: in 1945, France
was dominated by agriculture, but in recent years France has become the leading supplier
of advanced technologies in air, space and energy, partnering often with Germany to
create great technological progress (though merger issues regarding control of new
ventures and the role of the state remain sensitive).13 Through this important symmetry,
neither country depicts its neighbor as an enemy, but as a neighbor with a shared desire to
increase growth and productivity.

9

Heipertz, Martin, and Amy C. Verdun. Ruling Europe the Politics of the Stability and Growth Pact.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010. Print.
10
See Note 9: Heipertz & Verdun
11
See Note 9: Heipertz & Verdun
12
See Note 9: Heipertz & Verdun
13
See Note 2: Bruggemann
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CHAPTER 1: GERMANY’S RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER
Recent literature has shown that journalists believe Germany to be on the road to
overtaking France in terms of relative power in the leadership of the EU, but is this a
valid claim? In this section, I will present examples of Germany’s consistent economic
strength relative to France in order to showcase that Germany has been a stronger power
than France since the creation of the European Union.
Despite the high levels of economic convergence and interdependence between
France and Germany, there remain economic disparities between the two countries. Over
the past 60 years, Germany has consistently held a higher economic, financial and
monetary weight in the European Union, maintaining the fact that the two countries are
the fourth and fifth largest economic powers in the world, and the first two in Europe.
Economically, Germany has constantly been strong. In 1995, German GDP represented
approximately one third of combined EU output. Germany has been the key policy
initiator and agenda-setter for a wide range of issues, including launching the European
Monetary System in 1979.14 It has also contributed greatly to the institutional architecture
of the Union, including, but not limited to the strengthening of common macroeconomic,
social, and environmental policies, as well as introducing concepts such as subsidiarity
and multitiered governance to encourage the power of government from the bottom-up
rather than the top-down to produce results that cater to each region’s needs. Germany’s
power and influence throughout the creation of the EMU was derived through its
successful use of government diplomacy in addition to its policy credentials, reputation,
14

Mattli, Walter. The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and beyond. New York: Cambridge UP, 1999.
Print.
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actions, as well as the power politics played by private actors, traders in foreign
exchanges, and its successful investment patterns. Germany’s ability to derive its
demands successfully through negotiation and cooperation created a very noticeable tilt
in the balance between Franco-German powers where more German desires were met
than French ones.
1.1: The Franco-Germany Relationship through the Creation of the European
Monetary Union and the Stability and Growth Pact
The strength of the Franco-German relationship was vital to the foundation of the
European Monetary Union. Without either of the two countries, the EMU could not have
been created. Similar to past EU situations regarding Franco-German compromise, the
outcome of the negotiations resulted in lying closer to German demands rather than those
of France due to the relative political and economic leverage that Germany held over
France. At the same time however, it was important that Germany compromise in order
to acquiesce to its fellow member states, especially France, for example in dropping its
insistence on fully automatic sanctions.15 The endeavor involved much risk for both
France and Germany. Germany risked losing the monetary stability they had so carefully
rebuilt after spiraling inflation in the 1930s, and France risked possible economic
dominance by the Germans if they were not adamant enough in their requests.16 For
France, the difficulty lay in the fact that Germany had to be persuaded to relinquish both
the deutschmark and the Bundesbank’s control over monetary policy to Europe, and this

15
16
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meant that the EMU would have to be created on Germany’s terms, with substantial
concessions by France.
The political will showcased by both countries through the creation of the EMU
proved the ability of the Franco-German motor to achieve great progress for not only the
political integration of Europe, but the economic integration of Europe. The drive from
both countries to succeed gave substantial direction and momentum to the convergence of
economic interests in EMU policy. From the start of the negotiations, both France and
Germany were driven by a sense of moral obligation to successfully launch the EMU.
Convergence around sustainable non-inflationary growth was the key to making the
EMU agreement possible, and the ECB-centric nature of the euro kept Germany as the
dominant hand in EMU policy. The ability of France and Germany to work well together
was more important in the creation of the EMU rather than in its functioning as it was a
momentous example of cooperation and joint commitment between two unlikely allies to
show EU member states, as well as the international realm, that the creation of a
eurozone was not only a possibility, but a reality.
Although the prior examples may show that Germany held relative power over
France in the EU, there are other examples to suggest that France certainly exerted
political influence to counter its power balance with Germany. One of the most distinct
examples is Germany’s failure to use adequate political power to achieve more of its
desires through the designing of the Stability and Growth Pact - an agreement between
the seventeen eurozone members to facilitate and maintain the stability of the EMU:
consisting of fiscal monitoring by members, the European Commission, the Council of

13

Ministers, and warnings and sanctions against offending members. Germany agreed to
not have full automaticity in the SGP, which demonstrated a substantial concession.17
The legal nature of the SGP lay out the loss of bargaining power Germany experienced
after Maastricht. Throughout this process of decision-making, France was seen as having
relative bargaining power over Germany, and was therefore able to realize its preferences
more effectively. Additionally, French policy briefs controlled the political direction and
monetary policy through the issues of political accountability and legitimacy in the
SGP.18
Evidently, France and Germany were the two most important and powerful
countries in the creation of the SGP. Given its history with the powerful deutschemark
and notoriously strict Bundesbank, the German government was motivated to create the
SGP to insure against its increasingly EMU-skeptic populous. Though Germany initiated
the original idea of the Stability and Growth Pact, the inclusion of France throughout all
of the major decision-making created a natural two-headed leadership, with France and
Germany lying on either side of the spectrum. The other member states fell into place
behind whichever of the two ideologies suited them: be it the monetarily conservative
and strong Germany, or the harmonization and cooperation-desiring France; and France
and Germany became their spokespeople.19 Even today, the Commission has great
difficulty defending the SGP against the national interests of Germany or France.
Germany was certainly in the position to call for a strict SGP, but similar to its stance in
the creation of other important EU institutions and programs, it had to be willing to
17

See Note 9: Heipertz & Verdun
See Note 1: Maclean & Trouille
19
See Note 9: Heipertz & Verdun
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negotiate a compromise with its ideologically differing fellow member states. The joint
cooperation of France and Germany throughout the creation of the SGP contributed
greatly to the strengthening of the conflict-solving capacity of the two countries as a team
as the bilateral leaders of the European Union.
1.2: France and Germany in the Monetary Unification Process
Throughout the process of monetary unification, not only was Germany the most
powerful country in the European Union, but it relinquished more sovereignty than any
other state throughout the unification process. This renunciation of sovereignty allowed
Germany the power to set many of the economic conditions through the creation of the
EMU, and impose its views on the other member states. These views included setting the
provisions for the Maastricht criteria, which dictates that a country’s inflation remain less
than 1.5% below the EU average, their government deficit not exceed 3%, their public
debt remain below 60%, and their long-term interest rates remain below 2% higher than
those in the EU’s lowest rates.20 Other member states, including France, felt substantially
more pressure to “pass the EMU exam” than Germany, which put them in a weaker
bargaining position in EMU matters. Germany’s position as the unique hegemon of the
European Union, thanks in much part to its highly acknowledged and prestigious
Bundesbank, put Germany into place as the anchor of the European Exchange-Rate
Mechanism (ERM)21, with the deutschemark as the currency the euro would be modeled

20

"Maastricht Criteria." Euroveeb. 28 Mar. 2011. Web.
<http://euro.eesti.ee/EU/Prod/Euroveeb/Main_Page/left_menu/The_history_of_the_euro/maastricht.jsp>.
21
The European Exchange-Rate Mechanism (ERM) was a system introduced in 1979 to reduce exchange
rate variability and achieve monetary stability in Europe in preparation for the EMU and the euro.
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after.22 Due to Germany’s economic success, the Bundesbank was widely accepted as the
model for the statute of the ECB. Furthermore, because Germany entered the EMU with
the most powerful economy, the Maastricht criteria were set as a way to attempt to match
the other European economies to the status of Germany.23 The majority of citizens in
European member states agreed that the “EMU and the SGP are oriented along the lines
of the German model.”24 Although Germany was in a position to demand a strict Stability
& Growth Pact, it had to be willing to negotiate a compromise that would include
concessions as well in order to please its fellow member states.
As Germany’s resources have grown in the past two decades, so have their
diplomatic resources, which have led to Germany’s major influence on the structure of
the EU. Simon Blumer and William Paterson write that this influence is a “…potential
source of longer-term empowerment within the EU. The more the FRG secures the
modeling of EU institutions in its own image, the better it will be placed on the grounds
of familiarity to use them to its own ends.”25 Blumer and Paterson also write about the
effectiveness of indirect, or soft power by Germany in influencing the other member
states in the EU. This was achieved through the member states’ desire to emulate
Germany in order to reach political success and/or economic growth through adopting
Germany’s pattern of economic intuitions at the EU level. But is the German growth
strategy sustainable for other eurozone countries as well as for France?

22

See Note 1: Maclean & Trouille
See Note 9: Heipertz & Verdun
24
See Note 9: Heipertz & Verdun
25
Blumer, Simon, and William E. Paterson. "Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent
Leader?" Royal Institute of International Affairs 72.1 (1996).
23
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The outcome of the EMU negotiations, for reasons of power politics, lay closer to
German desires over those of France, or of any other member state. Moreover, alterations
to EMU or SGP conditions depended on the wishes of Germany. If Germany was not
pleased with a condition, it was likely that the condition would be changed to suit them.
Although Germany certainly acted as the leading hand through the creation of the EMU,
their leadership was essentially a way for France, and the other European member states
to ensure Germany’s participation in the European Union for both political and economic
advantages.26 In order to appease Germany, France made tremendous efforts to convert to
the rigorous German model, adopting budgetary discipline and monetary orthodoxy. The
countless French efforts to invigorate their economy did not evenly match the
concessions that Germany made through any of the EMU negotiations, offsetting the
balance of EU leadership.27
1.3: The Strength of the German Economy
The economic power balance between France and Germany has never been
completely equally balanced. A total Franco-German equilibrium would be difficult and
unrealistic to implement. The true power balance between France and Germany has
almost always been unequal, especially regarding the fact that the weight of German
businesses in terms of size, financial power, and turnover is about three times higher than
the weight of French companies. Germany’s GDP is roughly 24% larger than that of

26
27

See Note 1: Maclean & Trouille
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France: $3.31 trillion in 2010 compared to France’s $2.55 trillion.28 In 2010, France
represented 10.2% of German trade, whilst Germany represented over 19% of France’s
total trade, showing that trade-wise, France is far more dependent on Germany than
Germany is upon France. In the past few years, France has in fact increased the trade
deficit margin between itself and Germany. In 1998, France represented 11% of German
trade, whilst Germany represented 18% of France’s total trade.29 Additionally, external
sales of interior goods in the eurozone in the mid 1990s rose in Germany, and decreased
in France. This growing disparity between the French and German economies have
French elites constantly worried that they could fall further and further behind Germany,
overshadowed by the economic and financial weight of the Germans. Moreover, in terms
of social and infrastructural progress, Germany is currently more focused on deregulation
and cost cutting than France, which is currently focusing on issues such as regional
development, infrastructure, and knowledge transfer, which are policies which have
largely already been implemented in Germany.
Within the European Union, the German economy is conclusively the strongest. It
represents 25% of the Community’s GDP, and contributes roughly 25% to the EU’s
external and internal trade.30 The German economy is also the most productive, and has
continued this level of productivity throughout the growth of the European Union and the
monetary union. Economic growth rates for Germany have consistently been above the
European Union average, and German unemployment rates have remained below the EU
28

"France." CIA World Factbook. CIA, 6 Apr. 2011. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/fr.html>. "Germany." CIA World Factbook. CIA, 6 Apr. 2011.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html>.
29
See Note 1: Maclean & Trouille
30
See Note 14: Mattli
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average as well. In analyzing the previous data, can it be said that Germany has taken
over as the new leader of the EU? Although Germany suffered from inflation and
economic problems in the early 1990s immediately following German reunification, it
recovered remarkably well, and rose above all adversity to its current position as the most
powerful economy in the European Union.31 German unification absorbed political and
financial shocks, and there remains a strong commitment to multilateral diplomacy and
European integration within the German agenda, despite the fact that Germany has
continued to be largest financial contributor to the European Union over the course of the
growth of the Union. One of Germany’s greatest concerns is that its wealth will be
exploited by other EU member states in order to support other member states’ weaker
economies, especially given the recent eastward enlargement, but this will be explored
further in a later chapter.32
The shaping of EU institutional arrangement may favor German interests more
directly than those of other member states, which could give rise to distributional
concerns, but Germany depends economically on its European partners as much as they
depend upon Germany. Therefore, any policy that improves stability and security in
European trade and investment suits Germany as well.33 Moreover, German leadership
has been largely docile rather than imposing, as it is far more beneficial to build
concessions to reach a consensus rather than falter in dissent. For this reason, Germany
stressed the importance of the depoliticisation of monetary policy in order to maintain
economic stability among all member states. Depoliticisation of monetary policy not only
31

See Note 25: Blumer & Paterson
See Note 25: Blumer & Paterson
33
See Note 14: Mattli
32
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created unobstructed access to the prosperous single European market, but enabled the
German economy to expand through increased mergers and acquisitions, as well as
through increased imports and exports.
To summarize, throughout the course of the growth of the European Union, the
Franco-German relationship has been at the core of German European policy, where
integration between the two leaders; firstly Helmut Kohl and Francois Mitterrand, and
now Nicholas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel has been the center of European cooperation.
Although collaboration between France and Germany remained the main axis of the EU,
Germany’s surrender of the deutschemark in favor of the euro, the strongest currency in
Europe, placed them in a position of de-facto leadership, which has continued into the
political and economic negotiations of the European Union today.

20

CHAPTER 2: THE DISCOURSE ON THE CURRENT FRANCO-GERMAN
RELATIONSHIP
The growth and power balance of Franco-German relations since the start of the
European Union has continually been a source of great interest to journalists, students of
European affairs, and policymakers alike. Despite instances of tension and potential
crisis, France and Germany have maintained a close relationship since 1960. Bilateral
regularized intergovernamentalism has held the Franco-German relationship together
sturdily after a history of constant conflict. Both countries have acknowledged the
importance of their relationship in Europe: Former French President Valery Giscard
d’Eistaing expressed his view that “Europe cannot move ahead without the FrancoGerman engine,”34 President Sarkozy called Franco-German cooperation within NATO
“a great element of the Franco-German friendship,” and Chancellor Merkel expressed her
“delight” over further Franco-German cooperation in the future.35 Though Sarkozy has
been known to under-appreciate and underestimate the Franco-German axis, and
President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel’s relationship has not always been so cordial,
the two leaders have still managed to agree upon common positions ahead of big EU
summits.
In the past few months, however, positive reviews of the Franco-German
relationship have taken a turn for the south. Articles published since the European debt

34

Walker, Marcus, and David Gauthier-Villars. "Europe's 'Opposite Twins' Clash Over Future - WSJ.com."
The Wall Street Journal - Wsj.com. 2 July 2010. Web.
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704853404575323142895146902.html>.
35
McNicoll, Tracy. "Economic Crisis Brings Sarkozy and Merkel Closer - Newsweek.. 21 Mar. 2009.
Web. <http://www.newsweek.com/2009/03/20/how-the-crisis-is-reviving-the-old-french-germanaxis.html>.
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crisis have called European cooperation “more indecisive and more divided than ever
before,”36 and the reviews of the Franco-German relationship are no better. The
Economist calls the Franco-German axis a “myth” and stated in its January article,
“France loses Ground to Germany,” that “the myth of an equal partnership lends France
an exaggerated stature and protects Germany from accusations of outright
unilateralism.”37 The Wall Street Journal claims that France and Germany have reached
far more instances of disagreement rather than cooperation, stating that France and
Germany “have clashed recently on bailouts for Greece, the independence of the
European Central Bank, and what shape a new “economic government for Europe
proposed by France should take.”38 The European Institute claims that France and
Germany have “long ago lost that loving feeling” that united them and fueled their
success in the past. They claim that this has “died out” and Europe can no longer function
on the same axis as before. The two nations, they claim, have become too dissimilar to
maintain a “relationship” mainly because of their different economic statures.39
Though it is true that France and Germany do not always agree, I argue that this is
nothing new, and has not fundamentally changed the nature or the balance of the Franco36
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German axis. Although France and Germany may disagree upon certain ways that the EU
is governed, they have made very well on their promise to present a united front,
especially in the case of the financial fallout, consistently issuing joint statements and
positions, as was the case with their proposal for the future of economic governance in
Europe, and in further examples that I present below.
2.1: Germany’s Lead
“It is not true that Germany imposes its initiatives. The relationship has changed, but
only in the sense that it’s no longer a matter of the heart but of interests as well. People
say that Europe is run by Merkel and Sarkozy but, in this relationship, the woman is
stronger than the man.”40 - Laurent Wauquiez, French Europe minister
It is certain that there are differences between France and Germany, and these
differences are mainly dictated by economic power, but is this economic power
difference a shift, or simply a difference? As I argue in my paper, Germany has always
been the economically stronger member state, but this is no new information: it is being
highly sensationalized by the press as a new development since the European financial
crisis.
The Economist states, in fact, that France’s economy recovered more quickly
from the recent economic recession with a GDP shrinkage of only 2.6% in 2009, over
Germany’s shrinkage of 4.7% “…sustaining the illusion that everything was fine.”41 This
was no illusion. France’s economy emerged quickly out of the recession because of a
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strong, centralized government, quick-acting government economic stimulation, and a
strong welfare system which maintained domestic demand. The following year, German
GDP did grow faster than French GDP, but will this remain a pattern? The Economist
explains this as an effect of “reaping the benefits of years of wage moderation and labormarket reforms that improved its competitiveness.”42 Germany’s economy certainly
hasn’t suffered from the economic crisis to the extent that the other EU member states
have. The weakness of the euro over the past two years has increased the strength of
Germany relative to its neighbors. In 2010, the Germany economy grew by 3.7%, and
unemployment continued to fall. Thomas Petersen, a pollster, claimed that “The average
German never even noticed the crisis.”43 Moreover, while France attempts to reach a
budget deficit of 3% in 2013, Germany is attempting to achieve a budget deficit of 0% in
2014.
The creation of the euro was ironically aimed to keep Germany in check, and bind
it more tightly to Europe. This was largely a French led idea to monitor the growth of the
newly reunited Germany, and when the euro was first introduced, it encouraged the quick
growth of all the European member states but Germany. It has led instead to a situation
where Germany has emerged as the state with the strongest version of the euro.44 The
euro helped to make German economies the most competitive in Europe, without the
ability of France and Italy to decrease competition by a simple devaluation of their
currencies, as they had done in the past.
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2.2: Does France have Reason to Panic?
One of the other noticeable components of contemporary literature on the FrancoGerman relationship following the financial crisis was an overwhelming feeling of panic
from the French side over their realization of the impending German domination. The
most common example tended to be the verifiable fact that France is attempting to align
its tax structure with Germany’s to achieve more fiscal responsibility and stability;
though this shows less panic than admiration for the strict German tax structure. The
main argument presented in the existing literature is that France is panicking due to its
competitiveness with Germany. President Sarkozy was recorded as stating, “I cannot
accept a deficit in competitiveness with our main economic partner, Germany. I want to
lay the ground for a relatively homogenous fiscal zone.”45 France will have to work on
new ways to maintain their political and economic influence in Europe alongside
Germany.
The Economist article, “France Loses Ground to Germany,” states that the French
budget deficit is expected to be over 6% of GDP in 2011, while Germany’s will be under
3%. They even go so far as to label France “closer to Greece than Germany.”46 In reality,
France is making large efforts to keep their economy strong through an intense program
of growth and austerity that Finance Minister Christine Lagarde calls “Rilance” (rigeur et
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reliance).47 The program aims to combine a policy of a tight budget, with expense cuts,
tax loophole deductions, and reduced spending with a policy of increased employment,
increased investment and increased innovation. France is committed to saving €100
billion over the next three years to reach the Stability and Growth Pact budget deficit
level of 3% in order to not fall behind Germany.48 What Lagarde has planned for France
is essentially a plan of debt restructuring where the economy deflates through the use of
fiscal policy measures in order to eliminate its debts through a slow and painful process
in order to naturally regain economic growth.
2.3: Germany and France in the aftermath of the Economic Crisis
In negotiating post-2013 debt crisis management, The Economist states that “Mrs.
Merkel got what she asked for, while Mr. Sarkozy has been stuck on the sidelines”49 In
reality, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and plans for its successor were
very much decisions made jointly by the two countries. Wolfgang Schauble, Germany’s
Finance Minister, and Christine Lagarde sent a joint letter to the European Council
President, Herman Van Rompuy, suggesting a way to create more EU-wide fiscal
discipline by “barring an offending member state…from taking part in specific votes.”50
Christine Lagarde said in an interview supporting the remaining strength of the FrancoGerman axis, that, “The political sanction is something that was very much discussed
between Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy, the re-enforcement of financial
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sanctions is something that Germany has long called for, and the idea of the interestbearing deposit is something that we worked on together,” although she also expresses
that “Germany has always been very strong on the deficit-cutting, sanctions, discipline
and control.”51
Both France and Germany desire a new economic framework for Europe, but the
two countries have different ideas in mind, which has hindered progress for developing
such a framework. France would prefer to see the European Council turned into an
economic government, without the creation of any new institutions, while Germany
would rather replace the current rescue fund (the EFSF) with a program called the
European Stability Mechanism.52 Christine Lagarde also admits that there still exist
disagreements between France and Germany. She says that Germany is very insistent on
the European Central Bank being independent, but that the French wish for growth and
jobs to also be incorporated into the ECB agenda. “On that front,” Lagarde says, “there
is a stronger German sensitivity than French.”53 Lagarde holds that France cares just as
much about financial stability as Germany, and is willing to do what it takes to be
considered as heavily as Germany when it comes to economic decisions for the European
Union. At the same time, France has pride in its economic structure, and has no desire to
become Germany’s puppet. Lagarde claims, “Some of the German players probably
think, well “are the French really serious about it?” Are they going to be really
disciplined and solid in terms of cutting deficit and having a sustainable debt and will
51
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they be prepared to…do what it takes?...we think, well, do we really want to be in the
straight-jacket that Germany has imposed on its economy up until now?”54 The delicate
economic power balance between France and Germany has created a state of affairs with
more concessions from the French side rather than the German side, and the control of
monetary issues in Germany’s hands. Moreover, France would prefer that the post-crisis
mechanism be focused on the eurozone alone, while Germany wants all twenty-seven
member states in the EU involved in policy-making decisions, as Chancellor Merkel
believes that it is important for all member states to be as fiscally responsible as possible
in order to create the strongest European Union.55
The true source of Germany’s current economic power lies in the euro. Because
the European Central Bank is in Frankfurt, and decisions regarding the euro have
historically been based on the German model that created the successful deutschemark,
“Europe is dancing to Germany’s tune,” says Charles Grant, the director of the Centre for
European Reform, “Germany has the largest and strongest economy, the deepest pockets,
and the most solid AAA credit rating of any major European economy.”56 This power
places Germany in the position as the euro’s de-facto capital. In addition to its economic
differences, disagreements throughout the aftermath of the financial crisis placed
additional pressure on the Franco-German relationship. Germany was criticized for acting
too slowly after gaining knowledge of the difficult financial situation Greece, and
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President Sarkozy was recorded as having said, regarding Germany’s response lag,
“France is working on it; Germany is thinking about it.”57
2.4: Germany’s Diverging Interests
Politique Internationale, and other economic journals are claiming that Europe is
not as important to Germany as it was in the 1990s.58 Francois Heisbourg, an adviser at
the Foundation for Strategic Research claims that “everybody in France agrees that
Germany is becoming an ordinary country, where “the European interest” is no longer the
default mode.”59 For many German leaders today, the Franco-German relationship and
the EU have taken more of a backseat to Germany’s policy interests, and are no longer as
central as they were for the post-1945 generation to set Germany on a new course in
Europe.60 Wolfgang Schauble, one of the most pro-European figureheads in the 1990s,
was one of the driving forces behind European integration. Now, reports claim he no
longer feels the degree of solidarity that he once did with his fellow member states,
failing to vouch for them in times of difficulty.61
One of the main reasons Germany agreed to join the European Union after WWII
was its resulting guilt because of wartime events, and a desire to invest in collective
European reconstruction. Now, both of these motivating factors are no longer relevant,
and German economic interest seems to be declining as it becomes more concerned with
becoming an international power than with helping Europe. Germany has also
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increasingly become interested in Asian growing markets, as well as Russia, which is
seen more clearly through their activity in the energy sector.62 Moreover, German
taxpayers have griped about having to use their taxes to pay off the debts of other
European member states. Merkel would prefer to demonstrate that German taxpayer
money that is being used outside of Germany is being used to benefit Germany rather
than to benefit others.
The Franco-German motor cannot function without the joint commitment of both
parties. If France and Germany act together, Europe moves ahead, but if they cannot
agree, or do not commit fully to the task at hand, Europe stalls. With Germany taking a
front seat in European issues, and looking outside of Europe to new policy options, the
Franco-German axis diminishes in both importance and effectiveness. The philosophical
idea of the European Union asks that Germany commit fully to strengthening Europe
before looking outwards. “Germany is so preeminently powerful now, economically and
politically, that it’s changing the EU,” says the Centre for European Reform. “Germany
has become much more assertive of its own interests.”63
To summarize, the current discourse places Germany in a newfound powerholding position in Europe over France. The discourse has emphasized the opposition
between France and Germany, attempting to show that the two countries have been
unable to compromise, and have emerged following Germany’s lead. Journals like The
Economist have claimed that the nations are too dissimilar to maintain the strong
“relationship” they once held, underlined mostly by their economic differences, which
62
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has created an environment where Germany no longer needs France as it once did.64
Moreover, the discourse has emphasized an unsavory relationship between President
Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel, labeling the two as “opposite twins” who suffer from a
lack of trust.65
Though the two countries may have economic differences, this does not have to
underscore the power of their political relationship. As my research has shown, Germany
has always been the economically stronger of the pair, and the relationship has remained
strong into the twenty-first century. To some extent, this has had to do with the fact that
France had more political clout than Germany in the late 20th century due to their seat on
the United Nations Security Council, their relationship with the United Kingdom and the
United States, and their reputation in the world post-World War II. In the past few
decades however, Germany has regained its positive political reputation with its success
in the European Union both politically and economically, so this gradual shift may alter
the future of the Franco-German relationship. Despite this change, it still takes French
agreement to further legislation, meaning that France maintains the ability to act as an
obstacle within the European Union.
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CHAPTER 3: DEMONSTRATING GERMANY’S RELATIVE POWER
THROUGH AN EXAMINATION OF THE EU BUDGET
Budgets are of enormous importance to the evolution of the European Union both
politically and economically, though it is very small relative to national budgets –
representing only about 1% of the EU’s GDP. The European Union budget has
consistently been a topic of much discussion, in terms of where EU money comes from,
how it is spent, and the processes by which it is distributed. Since the formation of the
EU budget, Germany has been the largest net contributor to the EU budget, redistributing
resources through programs such as the European Regional Development Fund, the
European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund.66 Its net contribution to the EU budget
increased from €5.37 billion in 1987 to €11.25 billion in 1992, and in 2007 was €7.42
billion.67 For recent years, since the conversion to the euro, additional studies have been
carried out to measure the relative contributions from each member state to the EU
budget, and the results are interesting. They show that Germany’s contribution, although
the highest in numerical terms, does not remain so when compared per capita to the
GDPs of the other member states as well, which makes for compelling debate regarding
claims that Germany “carries the burden”. This will be explored later in the chapter.
Politically, the EU budget is important because the money contributed represents
a commitment of resources to public goods from a member state. Budgetary flows to
member states are highly visible in that “winners” and “losers” can be easily calculated.
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The net budgetary balance of a member state is determined by the net cash flow received
by the member state from the EU budget in that particular year. This includes cash
inflows from the EU budget to the national budget, cash inflows received by final
beneficiaries, and all cash outflows from the member state to the budget, based on TOR,
VAT and GNI68 contributions.69 In 2003, the EU budget was equivalent to 2-4% of the
combined national budgets of the member states, with its payments representing 1% of
the Community gross national income. Though the budget may have little
macroeconomic significance when applied to the European Union as a whole, it is
extremely important for those member states receiving transfers from the budget’s
structural funds.
3.1: Germany and the Net Contributors of the EU Budget
Paying for unification in the early 1990s had a major influence on German
citizens’ attitudes to the EU budget, and Germans began to frequently voice their
opinions about sharing the financial burden of the EU with their fellow member states.70
The German Chancellor, Gerard Schroeder too, was determined to reduce Germany’s
high net contributions to the EU budget. Although German reunification significantly
altered the German economy, with Germany’s per capita income falling from second the
sixth place amongst EU member states, it remained the biggest paymaster of the EU
68
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budget through all of its economic restructuring. In December of 2003, the six largest net
contributors to the EU budget (Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, the UK, and the
Netherlands) expressed their concerns about the overall expenditure of the budget in a
letter to the President of the European Commission. The letter included provisions
requesting that the budget expenditure not exceed 1.2% of EU GNI, and that the
conclusions of the Brussels European Council in October 2002 regarding agricultural
subsidies until 2013 be respected.71 The proposal sought to strike a balance between
spending for new member states and the desires of the current net beneficiaries of
cohesion policy. Current beneficiaries did not want to halt transfers of funds to their
poorest regions, and threatened to demand compensation if their regions would lose funds
due to the new transfer programs to newer member states. Net contributor states like
Germany opposed such compensation, whereas beneficiary states such as Ireland, Spain
and Portugal insisted on the need to maintain such support until 2014.72
For France, the permanence of the agricultural agreement from October 2002 was
one of its top priorities in its negotiations towards the next financial perspective, while
for the UK, the main concern was to keep the UK rebate intact to the fullest extent
possible.73 In the case of the United Kingdom, the rebate improved Great Britain’s
budgetary balance, as well as France’s, which led to a tight balance between the national
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interests of France and the UK throughout negotiations towards the next financial
perspective.74
Moreover, Germany and France, experiencing a low growth rate in 2002 and
2003, had failed to meet the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact- committing the
members of the euro to comply with the Maastricht criteria- which further decreased their
willingness to tolerate increases in the EU budget.75 Given that regional expenditure is
driven by strong interests, and agricultural expenditure was to be excluded from
negotiations under the Franco-German agreement of 2002, proposed increases in research
and development, and innovation and technology were likely to be rejected in order to
comply with the desires of the net contributors who favored a budget of austerity.
Overall, the net contributors were very resistant to endowing the Union with any
significantly larger financial resources.
3.2: A Statistical Examination of Germany’s and France’s role in the EU Budget
Looking at the contributions of member states to the EU budget, it is important to
clarify that individual net budgetary balances are negative in cases where the member
state contributes more than it receives in return. This number is often listed as NBB (Net
Budgetary Balance).
One of the most important aspects of this thesis is analyzing Germany and
France’s contributions to the EU budget, which I will do in part through the analysis of
graphs created and published by Terry Wynn, Member of the European Parliament &
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Chairman of the Committee on Budgets of the European Parliament, in his article, “The
EU Budget – Public Perception & Fact”, by Mojmir Mrak and Vasja Rant, “EU Consent,
EU Budget Working Paper: Financial Perspective 2007-2013: Domination of National
Interests,” and by Helen Wallace in her book, “Policy-Making in the European Union.”
My research revealed that one of the budget’s most frequently published years
was 2002, as it was the first year the euro was fully introduced into the eurozone. In the
attached graphs and charts, Figure 1: “2002 EU Net Contributors and Recipients,” shows
Germany and the United Kingdom as the highest net contributors to the EU, with Italy
and the Netherlands coming in 3rd and 4th place respectively, and France at a further
behind 5th place. Germany led the member states with a net contribution of close to €6
billion and France only contributed a third of this value: €2 billion. Even if the graph is
altered to calculate only real net balances, (minus traditional owned resources)
Germany’s and France’s contributions do not change, nor do their order of contributions.
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Figure 1: 2002 EU Net contributors and recipients (millions of euros)76

Giving a more general perspective of the breakdown of net contributions to the
EU Budget in “Figure 2: Net Contributions 1997 to 2006” we see that Germany is clearly
the largest net contributor throughout all ten years, with a net budgetary balance of €-11
billion towards the EU budget in 1997, and over €-6 billion in 2006. France on the other
hand, held a net budgetary balance of close to €-1.7 billion in 1997, and €-3 billion in
2006. Moreover, the graph shows that the United Kingdom ended the 1990s contributing
more money to the EU budget than France, but gradually began to contribute less and less
while France began to contribute more and more. To judge these numbers more clearly in
a numerical manner, as can be seen in “Figure 3: EU Budget Contributions 1999-2007,”
76

See Note 69: Wynn

37

in 1999, Germany had a net budgetary balance of €-8.54 billion, and throughout the
following 8 years, maintained an average net budgetary balance of €-7.03 billion. France
on the other hand, contributed net €-15 million in 1999 (more than 500 times less than
Germany), but swiftly and steadily increased its contribution until it reached a net
budgetary balance of €-3.01 billion in 2007, now only a little under half of Germany’s
contribution.
Figure 2: EU Budget77
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Figure 3: EU Budget Contributions 1999-200778

One of the most interesting graphs I encountered was Figure 4: “Net Contributors
and Recipients in 2002” and Figure 5: “Member States’ Contributions in Relation to their
Population,” which gave a surprising result, showing that in fact, Luxembourg, Denmark,
and Belgium are the three countries whose citizens pay most per capita towards the EU
budget, at €460, €318.50 and €295.90 respectively as their yearly contribution per capita.
Germany and France only paid €210 and €242.3 per capita respectively, with France
actually carrying a heavier financial burden per capita than Germany towards the EU
78
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Budget.79 On the other hand, Portugal, Greece, and Spain have the lowest per capita
contributions to the EU budget, which is less surprising, as they are typically
acknowledged as the eurozone’s poorest countries. This data concerning Luxembourg,
Denmark and Belgium is mostly due to the fact that countries with smaller populations
are contributing more per capita than countries with larger populations.
Figure 4: Net Contributions and Recipients in 2002 (in euro per citizen)80
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Figure 5: Member States’ Contributions in Relation to their Population81

Interestingly enough and best displayed in Figure 1, from 1997 to 2006, Germany
has gradually decreased its contributions to the European Union, while France has
gradually increased its own. Despite the reports that Germany has slowly been gaining
both economic and political traction against France, the opposite seems to be true in
terms of economic contributions.
This graph is most interesting as it decreases the previously assumed growing
economic omnipotence of Germany within the European Union. It shows that Germany is
not truly “carrying the burden” to the extent that those observing European Union politics
believed, as Luxembourg, Denmark and Belgium are even more economically involved
than Germany per capita. Does this mean they should increase their bargaining power
relative to their economic engagement? Should Luxembourg, Denmark and Belgium
have the ability to counter economic decisions made by Germany and France because
81
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their citizens are paying more per capita into the EU than Germany and France’s citizens
are? The truth is that overall economic contributions are more important to a member
state’s political weight than are per capital economic contributions, because their
presence in political and economic decision-making is simply larger than the presence of
other rich member states with small populations. This power held by Germany enables it
to be the leading voice in economic decisions because, although it may be paying a
similar per-capita contribution to the EU Budget as Austria or Sweden, the sheer number
of citizens paying that contribution within Germany’s population translates to a higher
collective bargaining power.
3.3: Bail-Outs & Financial Redistribution since the Debt Crisis
As I previously explored in my chapter on the current discourse of the FrancoGerman relationship, the recent economic crisis has put additional strain on France and
Germany, especially Germany, to make decisions about European financial redistribution
regarding the debt crises of the struggling member states. This new role adopted by
Germany has not pleased all member states and Germany has been viewed as being
determined to export its “culture of economic stability” to the entire euro area.82 As stated
by the European Council of Foreign Relations’ Ulrike Guerot and Mark Leonard, “There
has been a….’unipolar moment’ within the eurozone: no solution to the crisis was
possible without Germany, or against Germany.”83
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The financial crisis has paved the way for countless meetings and negotiations
between the leaders of the EU member states in order to solve the crisis. Debt-structuring
seems to be the most likely scenario that will come into effect, as permanent fiscal
transfers are highly unpopular among Europe’s richer core, especially Germany. Semipermanent fiscal transfers are more popular, in the form of euro bonds, but the richer
member states are unlikely to accept large budget transfers in order to write-off the debts
of poorer countries.84 The main issue is that the most financially disciplined member
states do not want to pay for the mistakes of the most reckless, as they do not feel obliged
to do so. Therefore economic responses among the leaders of richer member states have
been slow and often contradictory, creating resentment on both sides. Chancellor Merkel
has spoken publicly with frequency on the matter, in an attempt to reassure German
voters that Germany is not a “transfer union” in which taxpayers’ money is given to the
“sinners” on the periphery of the eurozone.85 Germany has always been highly involved
in European integration, and it is finding itself further ostracized by its fellow member
states due to such austerity. Germany has even been blamed for having some fault in
causing the crisis by publicly stating that insolvent countries may never be able to pay
back all of their debts. If Germany, France, and the other wealthier member states are
able to cooperate more effectively through the ability to represent all eurozone
economies, and not isolate those in genuine need of help, they may be able to reach a
popular consensus more quickly.

84

"The Euro Area's Debt Crisis: Hopes Raised, Punches Pulled | The Economist." The Economist. 10 Feb.
2011. Web. <http://www.economist.com/node/18114793?story_id=18114793>.
85
Peel, Quentin. "Germany: A Test of Strength." Financial Times. 11 Apr. 2011. Web.
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/12029500-6474-11e0-a69a-00144feab49a.html#axzz1JTC0FSWb>.

43

In an attempt to resolve issues surrounding the resolving of the debt crisis,
Germany and France have put effort into creating an initiative known as the
“Competitiveness Pact,” or a “grand bargain” where weaker member states agree to
overhaul their economies through a series of reforms in retirement and retirement ages,
corporate taxes, and wage indexation in order to remain part of the eurozone.86
Additionally, France and Germany have put forth a two-step objective in order to rescue
those economies on the brink of collapse, such as Greece and Ireland, with temporary
loans, and couple these efforts with increased economic rigueur to prevent future crises.87
Germany and France have already contributed billions of dollars to bailing out their
fellow member states: in May 2010, Germany contributed €22.4 billion to the bailout of
Greece, while France contributed a commendable €16.8 billion to the effort, with the
German press labeling the bailout, “the fattest check in [German] history.”88 As of April
7th, 2011, the total resources available for European bailouts totaled €864.8 billion,
including the €440 billion of the European Financial Stability Facility, (of which the
lending capacity is €250 billion) and €280 billion from the IMF (as illustrated in Figure 6
below) Of these funds, €110 billion have gone to Greece, €67.5 billion have gone to
Ireland, and €80 billion have gone to Portugal. Germany has contributed over €100
billion to the EFSF, and France has contributed just under €100 billion.89 Germany,
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Economics, Business & Finance. 10 Mar. 2011. Web.
<http://www.economist.com/node/18330371?story_id=18330371>.
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"BBC News - German Parliamentary Vote Backs Greece Bail-out Funding." BBC News - Home. 7 May
2010. Web. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8666860.stm>.
89
"European Bail-outs: Pay Pals | The Economist." The Economist - World News, Politics, Economics,
Business & Finance. 7 Apr. 2011. Web.
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/04/european_bail-outs>.
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France, Italy and Spain alone are contributing 75% of the bailout funds.90 The magnitude
of such contributions from richer member states enable countries like France and
Germany to make conclusive decisions regarding the future of European economic
governance, and to decide to what extent funds can be transferred from richer to poorer
member states, which is the main reason for such the slow decision-making process
among the leadership of the EU.
In summary, Germany has been the largest net contributor to the EU Budget since
its formation. Germany’s role as “paymaster” has enabled it to be the leading voice in
economic decisions, but has also made it reluctant to support fiscal transfers, especially in
light of the European debt crisis, as it does not find itself responsible for the economic
problems of its fellow member states. Interestingly enough, member states with smaller
but richer populations, like Denmark, Luxembourg, and Belgium are contributing more
per capita than Germany or France. In fact, Germany has decreased its contributions to
the budget whilst France has increased its own. It will be very interesting to see how
negotiations play out between these power players in solving the debt crisis and creating
a stronger financial framework for the euro.
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Collins, Sarah. "Finance Ministers Commit 700 Bn Euro to Future Bailouts." Europolitics. 22 Mar. 2011.
Web. <http://www.europolitics.info/finance-ministers-commit-700-bn-euro-to-future-bailouts-art29908128.html>.
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Figure 6: European Bail-Out Funds91
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See Note 90: Economist Bail-Outs
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CONCLUSION
Based on my findings and analysis, I conclude that the current Franco-German
power balance in the EU has not tipped in favor of Germany. The Franco-German power
balance has never been truly equal, and is unlikely to reach absolute equality in the
future. Germany has been the largest source of economic power in the European Union
since its creation, and has remained the stronger economic and political power throughout
the Union’s growth. Although Germany’s position in the European Coal and Steel
Community and the European Economic Community was weak initially following World
War II, its renunciation of much sovereignty allowed it the power to set many of the
economic conditions within the European Union. This leadership continued through the
creation of the EMU as it adopted the euro, leaving behind the strongest currency in
Europe.
In regards to the Franco-German relationship, despite the relatively stronger
German power, the Franco-German relationship has always remained within Germany’s
most important policy interests. Although the two countries may disagree upon certain
methods with which the EU is governed, or should be governed in the future, they have
consistently presented a united front, most notably in light of the financial crisis with
their joint-proposal for economic governance in Europe. Both Chancellor Merkel and
President Sarkozy remain committed to their role as partners in European Union
leadership, and claims that the nations have become too dissimilar to retain their
relationship are being proven incorrect as we enter the aftermath of the financial crisis.
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Looking towards the future, it is important that France and Germany continue to
commit wholeheartedly to reforming the financial framework of the eurozone. This may
dictate a move closer to a federation and the dreaded “transfer union” status, but this is
the commitment that the countries have made in joining the monetary union. Time will
tell whether Europe’s richer countries decide to financially support their weaker member
states, whether the weaker member states will devalue their way back to reality or
whether they will endure a harsh period of debt restructuring.
What will be interesting is to see how Franco-German dynamics play out in the
future. Will Germany pursue sole leadership of the EU or will it reduce its involvement?
Will France succeed in its rilance austerity measures and emerge from the decade with an
economy just as powerful as Germany’s? Either way, France has managed to remain as
powerful a political voice as Germany, as evidenced by its continuing ability to convince
Germany to make concessions (eg. Germany’s acceptance of greater coordination of
economic policy) and it is likely that whatever decision Europe decides to take in
reforming its monetary union, France and Germany will be at the forefront of
negotiations.
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